Policing Terrorism
Principles of target hardening and evaluated examples

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After 9/11

- Terrorism replaced crime as the greatest perceived threat to social order
- For a few years, it seemed that society’s guardians were intelligence agencies and the military not the police
- Federal $$$ were diverted from police to homeland security
- Then the picture changed
  - It was recognized that national security agencies cannot work alone in preventing attacks
  - They must develop partnerships with businesses and other public and private agencies, specially local police
- Three main roles for local police
  1. Being ready to respond in the event of an attack
  2. Collecting intelligence about possible terrorist activity
  3. Hardening targets
Policing Terrorism

These three roles are discussed in *Policing Terrorism*, the POP Center manual written with Graeme Newman.
This presentation

- Does not discuss the police role as first responders and will say only a little about the intelligence function
- Focuses on protecting vulnerable targets from attack, i.e., target hardening
- Does not provide practical guidance on protecting targets – too many different kinds of targets and many existing sources of advice available
- Deals only with the effectiveness of target hardening
- Describes two well-researched case studies:
  - The Israeli West Bank Barrier designed to prevent Palestinian terrorism
  - Measures to prevent airline hijackings, before and after 9/11
But first: CIA director James Woolsey’s testimony to Congress in 2004

“Only an effective local police establishment that has the confidence of citizens is going to be likely to hear from, say, a local merchant in a part of town containing a number of new immigrants that a group of young men from abroad have recently moved into a nearby apartment and are acting suspiciously. Local police are best equipped to understand how to protect citizens’ liberties and obtain such leads legally.”
By focusing on community policing, police can avoid:

- Compiling unsubstantiated lists of suspects
- Costly surveillance of suspects and places
- Charges of profiling
- Wiretapping and the legal and political encumbrances thereof
- Secret (and therefore suspect) operations
- Undermining community trust
- Working against their own communities
- Charges of entrapment
Principles of target hardening

• Know that terrorist attacks are still very rare – most police jurisdictions would be unlikely to attract terrorists
• Counter “what if?” with “how likely?”
• Don’t overstate the risk of foreign attack but beware the domestic terrorist
• Don’t waste time on motives
• Think terrorist
• Think of terrorism as crime
But surely crime and terrorism are different?

Are not terrorists motivated by a “higher cause”?

But: Self gratification and duty to family may drive individual operatives.

Are not terrorists more determined and willing to die?

But: Not all terrorists willing to die; not all suicide bombers are “determined.”
Terrorists’ main objective

• To succeed in the mission – the same as for criminals
• Both groups are rational actors. They will seek the best opportunities to achieve their ends – whatever these might be
• Opportunity plays a part in all crime – even murder:
  – Widespread ownership of guns in the US explains its high rate of homicide
• Opportunity reduction works with any form of crime, irrespective of motive
Case studies show that opportunity reduction can reduce terrorism

• “Ring of steel” substantially reduced IRA bombings of Belfast city center
• Embassy protections in the 1980s virtually eliminated takeovers of US embassies (soldiers deployed, access controls strengthened, embassy staff moved upstairs or to the back of the building)
• But evidence for these two cases is anecdotal
• Strong research evidence of the effectiveness of:
  • The Israeli West Bank Barrier
  • Measures to prevent airline hijackings
Identifying and protecting targets

- Identifying likely targets must be done with the city and private business, and targets should be prioritized for risk.
- In most cases the owners of high-risk facilities or buildings will have to undertake the target hardening. This could involve considerable expense.
- Where necessary, managers of other likely targets should be encouraged to improve their basic security.
- Police should emphasize the “dual benefits” of preventing both terrorism and crime.
- Planning applications for new facilities should be scrutinized by police to identify potential security hazards.
Which cities are at greater risk?

- A center of tourism
- Historical
- State capital
- Large with a many people
- Identified with an iconic product
- Near a large military base
- A federal office center
- A banking, business or manufacturing center
- Near a port of entry to the US
- A transportation hub

- Near an international airport
- A center of recent immigration (especially Islamic)
- A site of animal research laboratories
- A major site for petroleum refineries or nuclear facilities
- A major communications and computing center
- Center for federal buildings
Timothy McVeigh’s truck bomb destroys the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and kills 168 people, April 19, 1995
Which buildings or facilities are at greatest risk?

EVIL DONE

Exposed  Destructible
Vital     Occupied
Iconic    Near
Legitimate Easy
The Israeli West Bank Barrier
Its effectiveness in preventing terrorism

• Israel began to construct the barrier between Israel and the West Bank Palestinian territories in 2002 in response to a sharp increase in terrorist attacks during the Second Intifada

• An evaluation of the barrier’s effectiveness in preventing terrorist attacks has just been published

The West Bank

- Historically Palestinian territory West of the Jordan River
- Occupied by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War
- 1994 Accord gave the Palestinians limited self-rule and required withdrawal of Israeli troops
- Israel continues to be responsible for security in the West Bank
- The presence of Israeli settlements hampers full implementation of the Accord
The Barrier

- Built in 6 sections. When completed: 440 miles long. Width: 50-80 yards
- Follows the Green Line (the 1949 Jordanian-Israeli armistice line), but in places intrudes 10 miles into the West Bank, isolating about 9.5% of the territory
- Central component a “smart” fence to alert security forces to any attempt to cross the Barrier
- Supplemented by 30 miles of concrete walls to block terrorists shooting at Israeli vehicles on highways
- A 6-8 feet wide trench on the Palestinian prevents vehicles from crashing into the fence. Along the trench there is a paved service road as well as another delaying obstacle comprised of barbed wire
- On the Israeli side, there are dirt roads (designed to reveal footprints of those who have crossed), and patrol and armored vehicle roads
- Lookouts and security cameras throughout
- Dozens of checkpoints and secured gates
1. Surveillance cameras
2. Barbed wire
3. Fine sand
4. Paved road
5. A ditch 6-8 ft (1.8-2.4m)
6. Fence (10ft/3m)
7. Dirt road
The Barrier’s costs for Israel

- Substantial economic cost of building such a large structure

- Barrier has been widely condemned internationally
  - The United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the Red Cross, Amnesty International, the World Council of Churches and other international bodies have declared the barrier illegal
  - Under the Fourth Geneva Convention the barrier is considered a war crime because it inflicts “collective punishment” on the residents of the West Bank (an occupied territory) by making their lives nearly impossible
  - The barrier is said to be an unlawful attempt to establish *de facto* borders between Israel and a future Palestinian state, in effect annexing large parts of the West Bank and all of East Jerusalem
  - Many demonstrations and protests by Palestinians and others who call the barrier The Apartheid Wall
Palestinians protest against the Barrier
Israel claims

- Only began building the barrier when terrorism reached unprecedented levels
- The Geneva Conventions explicitly allow structures to be built for purposes of self-defense
- The barrier is solely a security measure and will have no bearing on future peace negotiations
- Only 5%-8% of the West Bank and less than 1% of Palestinians will end up on the Israeli side of the barrier
- Many democracies have built walls to keep out terrorists or illegal immigrants, such as the U.S./Mexico border fence and walls separating Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods in Belfast
Research questions

• The study did not deal with the political controversies surrounding the Barrier
• It sought only to evaluate the Barrier’s effectiveness in preventing terrorism
• Did the Barrier displace attacks from
  • segments with an operational Barrier to those without
  • from the Israeli side to the Palestinian side, or
  • was there in each case a diffusion of benefits?
• Did the terrorists adapt their modes of attack when the Barrier had been in place for some time?
Data used

- Information about 17,706 terrorist attacks provided by the Israeli Security Agency

- 3,296 terrorist attacks on the Israeli side of the Barrier and 14,410 in the West Bank

- Israel collects data about terrorism in the West Bank because security there is under Israel’s jurisdiction

- Most attacks in the West Bank were committed against Israeli settlements
## Kinds of attack

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of Attack</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Kind of Weapon</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shootings</td>
<td>7524</td>
<td>Hand grenades</td>
<td>104</td>
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<tr>
<td>Molotov cocktails</td>
<td>6226</td>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>2309</td>
<td>Kidnappings</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(including 125 suicide bombings)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabbings</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>Car bombs</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>Anti-tank weapons</td>
<td>26</td>
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Summary of findings

1) Suicide bombings against targets in Israel were almost eliminated – when only half the Barrier had been built
2) Declines in suicide bombings, fatalities and attacks in different segments anticipated the actual implementation of the Barrier
3) Little evidence of displacement of attacks to the Palestinian side of the barrier
4) In fact, the Barrier produced a considerable “diffusion of benefits”
5) The segment of the barrier closest to Jerusalem showed adaptive changes in methods of attack after the construction of the Barrier, with increases in the frequency of Molotov cocktails and assaults stabbings
3-monthly Terrorist Attacks and Fatalities (Israeli Side of the Barrier)
Why so much diffusion of benefits?

The Israelis’ favored explanation
• The Barrier altered the terrorists’ operating environment, generated a hostile setting, and created ongoing intelligence and operational pressure on the terrorists
• This pressure resulted in an ineffective, stressful, and defensive mode of self-preservation. Terrorists “on the run” had less time, resources and capabilities to plan and carry out terrorist attacks

The researcher’s favored explanation
• The Barrier deeply discouraged the Palestinian terrorists
• They had previously been able to inflict severe casualties on Israel almost with impunity. This gave them the upper hand, it emboldened them and it provided them with enormous propaganda benefits among Palestinians at large
• The Barrier destroyed these benefits and it is not hard to imagine how this might have substantially demoralized the terrorists
Evidence of adaptation

- Over time, there was a steady increase in Molotov cocktails and assaults on the Israeli side of the Barrier near the segment that includes Jerusalem which has a large population of Palestinians who reside on both sides of the Barrier.
- While terrorists among this population would find it difficult to take guns or explosives through the checkpoints, they do not need any special equipment for Molotov cocktails or assaults.
- Molotov cocktails and assaults are among the simplest of terrorist attacks. Those making them were probably not the same group of sophisticated terrorists who had previously orchestrated suicide bombings, which require detailed planning and a complex support infrastructure.
The results contradict the suicide bombing experts

• Leading experts on suicide bombings emphasize the ideological and motivational factors in suicide bombings

• They do not believe a barrier could be effective:
  – Bloom (2005) argues: “…the key is to reduce the Palestinian motivations for suicide bombing rather than their capabilities to carry them out.”
  – Pape (2005) claims that suicide attacks are effective in forcing foreign powers to retreat. His proposed “intervention”: the United States, Israel and other occupying forces should cease their foreign military occupations
The secret deal to reduce hijacking in the 1970s
Baggage screening
# Airliner Hijackings and Bombings

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No. Years</th>
<th>Average Hijackings Per year</th>
<th>Bombings Per year</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>Other Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961-67</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>58.0</td>
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<td>1971-72</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
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<td>1973-85</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986-89</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td>1990-00</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-03</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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</table>
Summary of findings

- Hijacking greatly reduced (huge increase in flights)
- No displacement to other countries or to bombings – not surprising
- Has been claimed that terrorists switched to other forms of attack, elsewhere in world. **But:**
  - Methodological problems in the studies
  - Not easy to adapt (embassy takeover vs IED)
  - Terrorist not a global brotherhood (Middle East vs. IRA)
  - **But** 9/11 terrorists showed longer term ADAPTATION
Airline security improved after 9/11

- Sky Marshall program expanded
- Cockpit doors strengthened and kept locked
- Passenger searches tightened up
- Passengers required to stay seated longer at landing/take-off
- Pilots allowed to carry guns
- Transport Security Administration created
- Flight training schools more closely watched
- Profiling research beefed-up
Could we have another 9/11?

• Research studies show that criminals are adaptive – they commonly find ways round existing preventive measures

• This is what the 9/11 terrorists did – they found ways round existing baggage and passenger screening measures

• Could some new terrorist group find ways to defeat the post-911 airliner security?

• Especially given human complacency
Criminal adaptation: UK credit card frauds

Annual Fraud Losses on UK-issued cards 2004–2014

Remote purchase (CNP)

Lost & Stolen
Counterfeit
Card ID theft
Card non-receipt

Is adaptation a real threat?

- Nobody knows – certainly not an academic such as me, distant from policy making by the DHS and other federal authorities.
- Given the terrible consequences of a repetition, we must assume that the authorities will remain focused on further target hardening measures.
- That they will not be distracted from this goal by the need to identify and take out potential terrorist groups.
- Aircraft designers should be included as partners in identifying and designing out vulnerabilities in future airliners – for example, could cockpit restrooms be provided?
“CAN YOU SHOW ME ON THE DOLL WHERE AIRPORT SECURITY TOUCHED YOU?”
Thank you
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