

Failure


Scott H. Decker

Criminology and Criminal Justice


Arizona State University

Failure, who cares?

Got a cell phone? You care.



Type I error
(false positive)



Type II error
(false negative)



Figure 3.1 Type I and Type II errors

levels to .01 or even .001

Carte Figurative des pertes successives en hommes de l'Armée Française dans la campagne de Russie 1812-1813.

Dressée par M. Minard, Inspecteur Général des Ponts et Chaussées en retraite. Paris, le 20 Novembre 1869.

Les nombres d'hommes présents sont représentés par les largeurs des zones colorées à raison d'un millimètre pour dix mille hommes; ils sont de plus écrits en travers des zones. Le rouge désigne les hommes qui entrent en Russie, le noir ceux qui en sortent. — Les renseignements qui ont servi à dresser la carte ont été puisés dans les ouvrages de M. M. Chiers, de Légar, de Fezensac, de Chambray et le journal inédit de Jacob, pharmacien de l'Armée depuis le 28 Octobre.

Pour mieux faire juger à l'œil la diminution de l'armée, j'ai supposé que les corps du Prince Jérôme et du Maréchal Davout qui avaient été détachés sur Minsk et Mohilow et qui rejoignent vers Orscha et Witebsk, avaient toujours marché avec l'armée.





TABLEAU GRAPHIQUE de la température en degrés du thermomètre de Réaumur au dessous de zéro.

Les Cosaques passent au galop le Niemen gelé.



Auq. par Regnier, 8. Par. S^{te} Marie St G^{er} à Paris.

Imp. Lit. Regnier et Bourdet.

“Failure” When success isn’t an option.



FAILURE

We can't spell failure without U.

SlapFish.com 'A Slap in the Face With a Wet Fish'

Recognizing the Importance of Failure

Failure is the modal outcome.

We should be suspicious of success, whether it is a successful program or a hypothesis that is supported. Failure, after all is easier to achieve. We probably learn more from failure too.

Failures I have participated in...

A brief review of multiple failures.

Status Offender Diversion Program

1977 Goal: Divert status offenders from formal processing.

No Referrals from the police...

Process evaluation showed:

1. Status offenders were ignored by LE.
2. More serious offenders received diversion.
3. Truancy was strongly related to residential burglary.

Program failed. Why? Adaptive Systems.

The COPS Anti-Gang Initiative

2001 Fifteen cities, “produced results”.

Funded by COPS office.

Ill-defined program, lack of clear goals.

No process evaluation.

No program model. Ready, Fire, Aim.

The Gangbuster





St. Louis Gun Buyback Program

September 1992, the peak of the St. Louis homicide problem, daily newspaper tallies and Number 1 ranking.

Overwhelming success, 9,000 guns bought.

Kind of guns bought: most didn't work, collectors dumped useless guns, few were at risk for use.

October saw highest number of homicides in history


Opportunity for community mobilization missed.

Lack of clearly defined goals: guns bought or public safety?

Buns for Guns? Lap dances for guns turned in at East Side Strip clubs.

St. Louis Homicide Project

Average Homicide Rate Per 100,000 (1995-2000)



U.S.

Pop – 1.2%

Hom – 20% (3531)

St. Louis

Pop – 4.2%


Hom – 40% (55)

East St. Louis

Pop – 7.4%

Hom – 44% (10)

Location of Recovered Firearms in St. Louis City





CAUTION
CHILDREN

No Parking
← →

1516

1. 8 '02

Firearm Suppression Program/ Consent to Search

Grant submitted in June, Funded in October, Program gone by November 1.
Program? Whose Program?

12 officers, 410 guns, average two guns per house, guns found in half of all houses, 98% give consent, including several who offer keys to the police.

THEN, program goes away with no institutional knowledge of the program.

Program comes back in two different forms:

- a. Cynical warrants served
- b. Ministerial involvement, referrals from juvenile court, with supposed follow-up

Ministerial – police antagonism.

How do we know that officers won't steal from residents?

How do we know that preachers won't sexually abuse boys referred to them?

Close the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections

Governor Jan Brewer proposes closing ADJC in February 2010.

Application to NIJ for funding in March 2010. Funded 9/2010.

Governor decides not to close ADJC in November, 2010.

What now?

Process of closure is critical to understand. See California....

Governor Brown has proposed to close the Division of
Juvenile Facilities...Less Government?

Stay tuned.

Gang Reduction Program

Kick off meeting – “I am the angry black man.”

Four cities selected and target areas selected without local consultation.
Milwaukee, North Miami Beach, Los Angeles and Richmond (VA).
\$2.5 million per site, TA, Comprehensive OJJDP Gang Model.

Several of the cities report no gang statistics.
In some of the cities, there are no gangs in the target areas.
Local infighting and resistance to interventions.


One city loses its funding. One can't find gangs. One has success at implementation of the model. One actually reduces gang crime.

What is success? One out of four?

Racial Profiling

- Missouri AG Report before statewide study.
- Advisory Council involved in planning and response process. “I have a problem with your numbers.”
- Diverse Advisory Council responds to the same findings quite differently.
- City analysis of individual officers.
- The “Z score” talk, and outlier officers.
- “Drilling down.”
- Some policies are consistent with other knowledge, IA reports.

Distribution of Officer Z-Scores



Variations By Functional Assignment

Table I. Population Distribution by District and Traffic Stops Disparity Scores^a

District	Total Population	% of City Population	White ^b Population	% White In District	Black ^c Population	% Black in District	White Disparity All Officers	Black Disparity All Officers	White Disparity Traffic Officers	Black Disparity Traffic Officers	White Disparity District Officers	Black Disparity District Officers
1	62,790	18	45,853	73	12,192	19	1.03	1.07	1.11	.81	.82	1.76
2	61,307	18	55,800	91	2,930	5	.80	4.75	.84	4.31	.72	6.33
3	73,545	21	29,614	40	38,199	52	1.20	.92	1.26	.87	.80	1.22
4	9,373	3	1,987	21	7,099	76	2.35	.62	2.82	.49	1.79	.77
5	17,503	5	1,517	9	15,654	89	2.78	.84	3.52	.76	1.24	.99
6	42,630	12	2,075	5	39,973	94	5.06	.79	4.11	.84	1.34	.99
7	36,730	11	5,410	15	30,066	82	1.28	.97	1.76	.88	.46	1.13
8	21,223	6	155	1	20,829	98	6.03	.97	8.80	.95	3.13	.99
9	23,088	7	10,255	44	11,324	49	.75	1.31	1.28	.82	.34	1.70
Total	348,189		152,666	44	178,266	52	1.09	.92	1.10	.75	.61	1.37

a The Disparity Score = proportion of stops / proportion of population. A value of 1 represents no disparity; values greater than 1 indicate overrepresentation.

b Includes Hispanic White

c Includes Hispanic Black

“Drilling Down” makes the picture more clear...for now...for some.

Disparity Score: 1 = Proportional Representation

> 1 = Overrepresentation

< 1 = Under representation

Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative

Gun Violence Reduction Strategy, Problem Solving Approach.

Probationers disproportionately show up as victims and offenders.
State Probation's response: "That isn't our problem."

Trauma Intervention Program

- ER Based Intervention

- Returned knives.

- Homeboys in the park.

Fifth District Initiative

- Crime down until PD Promotions.

In the most violent city in America, the Mayor, Police Chief, US Attorney and Prosecutor don't meet regularly.

In the face of this, how do you create a credible threat to offenders?

Project Safe Neighborhoods

Eastern District of Illinois.


2% of the population accounted for more than half of the violent crime in the district.

US Attorney's "sham district residence" raided by ATF which found illegal firearms.


East St. Louis Police Chief indicted by the US Attorney. Nothing hurts a partnership like an indictment of one of the partners.

Some interventions lack the partnership, the will, the focus and frankly the ability to succeed.


East St. Louis Population Change (1900-2000)




Homicide Rate 2001



East St. Louis Violent Crime Rate Per 100,000 1970 - 2001



WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR GETTING THE GUN?*



* Percents were calculated based on respondents who reported "yes" to owning or possessing a gun.

VALID RESPONSES
2005: N = 105

Project Safe Neighborhoods
SDIL Adult Interviews
University of Missouri - St. Louis

Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grant Program (JAIBG)

10,000 home visits a year.

Curfew program designed to reduce offending and victimization.

Curfew enforcement after 8 pm.

HOWEVER, peak time for victimization and arrest was 4-6 pm.

Some efforts fail despite being the right intervention because they don't have the right focus or the right "mechanics".

Safe Futures

The St. Louis SafeFutures Experience

Five Years, \$7 million, targeted area, targeted intervention, theory-driven.
Based on the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Strategy

Collaborative program, including Juvenile Courts, Division of Youth Services, BBBS, BGCA, St. Louis Public Schools, Mentoring, Job Training, Counseling and Tutoring Services

Failed to include police, prosecutor, community groups.
Failed to anticipate large-scale agency turf wars.

Main conclusions from Process and Outcome evaluation:

“Can’t find the program”

Matched controls with traditional services (detention, supervision) do better than program youth

“It may be easier to change the behavior of youth than the system.”

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES-Failure of Ministerial Alliance to Pitch in

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT – CITY OF ST. LOUIS INTRA-DEPARTMENT REPORT AND CORRESPONDENCE SHEET

Date: June 6, 2005

**To: Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Pollihan, Assistant Chief
Bureau of Community Policing**

From: Commander, Anti-Crime Task Force


Subject: Anti-Crime Task Force Nightly Memorandum

Task Force officers were able to conduct patrols in each of the targeted neighborhoods for approximately two hours. Two officers arrested the juvenile at 5300 Robin (Walnut Park East) after he was found in possession of a spring air pistol resembling a Sig Sauer P-228. The officers observed the juvenile, along with three other juveniles, **seated on the front stoop of a church at the above location and displaying the described weapon to the others.** The juvenile discarded the weapon onto the ground upon seeing the approaching officers who had stopped to investigate believing the weapon to be a real firearm. The juvenile has no prior juvenile history. He was x-booked and released to the custody of his mother. The juvenile in possession of the gun was **twelve years old.**



**Archbishop
Rigali . . .**

Welcome!



**CATHOLIC
CHARITIES
OF SAINT LOUIS**

**Sixty-two programs & agencies helping people in need
in the St. Louis Archdiocese.**

High Level Drug Smuggling Interview Project

42 high level drug smugglers in US Federal Prisons
Average of 800 pounds of cocaine
Convicted between 1992 and 1998
Roles: Organizers, Captains, Brokers, Sailors

Deterrence, Technology, Adaptation, Dynamic Nature
Of Offending

Submarines? Mexico?

\$2 Million of Cocaine



Challenges to Law Enforcement



The “Snortilus”

Coast Guard Commander: “Drug smugglers are incapable of using submersibles.”

Lessons From Failure

Failure has many virtues.

Failure produces the unexpected, pushes our theories and understanding of problems.

Failure challenges conventional expectations.

Failure leads to a consideration of multiple treatment interference, poor program implementation, lack of program fidelity and focus, personnel turnover, dose size, and a host of other impediments to successful program outcomes.

Leads us away from doing “stupid things” boot camp, scared straight, self esteem building.

Success breeds complacency.

More Lessons

- Ready, Fire, Aim
- Monitoring, Recalibration
- Leadership
- Community involvement - sustainability, buy-in
- Be prepared for deviations
- Document the process and process outcomes
- Focus on the outcomes
- Sustainability may be even more difficult than success

General Principles of Change

- **The Plan** rarely gets implemented as designed.
- Final Reports make the process seem as if it was seamless, it rarely is.
- Cultural Change is harder – and more important – than Institutional Change.
- Institutional Change is Important.

- Change takes time, commitment and many steps.
- Sometimes time and commitment aren't enough to produce change.
- Even a rational process often doesn't produce the desired results.
- Priorities can change, programs typically lag behind such changes.

- Not everyone interprets the same set of facts in the same way.
- Effective leaders can make a difference.
- Outputs are important. Outcomes are more important.
- Success is temporary, failure is the modal outcome, and failure is likely to return. Quickly.

Even the “best” embrace failure



**HARVARD
BUSINESS
PUBLISHING**

**Use Failure to
Grow Your
Business**


An Interview with
Rita McGrath
Professor
Columbia Business School



And we have plenty of failure to keep us occupied.



LODGING
NEXT RIGHT



State Prison